Is there a potential for any regulatory or legal challenges that could mitigate the tariff impact?

Short answer: Yes. While the headline‑level cost‑impact numbers (hundreds of millions of dollars) are real and immediate, companies like Stanley Black & Decker, Conagra and others have a few “legal‑and‑regulatory” tools that could, at least in theory, soften or even overturn the tariff burden. Whether any of those tools will succeed depends on the specifics of the tariff measure (e.g., the legal basis for the duty, the product classifications, the timing of the rulemaking, and the political climate), but the following avenues are the most commonly pursued in situations like this:

1. Administrative Relief & Exemptions (U.S. Government‑level)

Takeaway: Administrative waivers are the fastest possible route, but they are limited to “critical” or “national‑security” items and require a formal petition process that can take weeks to months.

2. Congressional Action

1. Legislative “softening” of the tariff – Members of Congress can sponsor a bill or amendment that either reduces the tariff rate or provides an “industry‑specific carve‑out.” This is the path the automotive industry successfully used in 2022‑2023 to obtain a temporary 8‑percent tariff reduction for certain steel and aluminum products.

2. “Sunset” provisions – Congress can attach a provision that forces the Treasury to re‑evaluate the tariff after a set period (e.g., 12‑month review). Companies can lobby for a “review‑by‑Congress” clause.

3. Compensation mechanisms – Congress could create a “tariff‑relief fund” that would reimburse affected companies, or could authorize a tax credit to offset the increase in costs.

Likelihood:

- Moderate in the current political environment: The administration has recently announced a “trade‑policy shake‑up,” which has been met with strong lobbying from multiple sectors (including the consumer‑goods and tools sectors). While the administration is not yet willing to roll back tariffs, it may be willing to add a “review” provision to appease industry and avoid a broader backlash.
- Low for outright elimination of the tariff without a broader policy shift (e.g., a reversal of the new trade stance).

3. Judicial Challenges

A. Statutory Authority Challenge

• Basis: Plaintiffs argue the Treasury/Commerce lacked statutory authority to impose the tariff (e.g., the tariff is outside the scope of the trade act or violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the rule was “arbitrary and capricious.”)
  
• Potential success: Low to moderate. The courts typically give the executive branch wide latitude in trade matters; however, if the tariff was adopted without a proper notice‑and‑comment period or without proper statutory grounding, a court could vacate the rule. This is a high‑cost, high‑uncertainty approach and rarely succeeds unless there’s a clear procedural flaw.

B. International Trade Law (WTO)

• Basis: The U.S. could be sued by a foreign government (or by a domestic company that is a “party” to a WTO dispute) alleging that the tariff violates an existing WTO commitment (e.g., a violation of the “most‑favored‑nation” (MFN) principle). The dispute would go through the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, which could result in a WTO “negative ruling” and a demand for retaliation or removal of the tariff.
  
• Potential success: Low for the U.S. (the U.S. is the imposing party, not the respondent). However, if the tariff violates a bilateral treaty (e.g., US‑Canada‑Mexico agreement (USMCA)), the affected foreign government may file a WTO complaint that could eventually lead to a remedial action.

C. Constitutional/Commerce Clause Challenges

• Basis: A claim that the tariff is an unconstitutional overreach of the Commerce Clause or violates the “due‑process” clause because it discriminates against particular industries.
  
• Potential success: Very low. U.S. courts have historically upheld broad tariff authority under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause and have been reluctant to strike down trade measures on constitutional grounds.

4. Strategic Litigation & Settlement Options

1. Class‑action suits – If the tariff applies differently to a group of “domestic‑producer” versus “foreign‑producer” goods in a way that violates the “Equal Protection” or “Due Process” rights under the Administrative Procedure Act, a coalition can bring a class‑action suit. Courts often grant “preliminary injunctions” if the plaintiffs can show a high probability of success and a likelihood of irreparable harm.

2. Negotiated settlements – The U.S. Department of Commerce can negotiate “settlement agreements” that allow for a reduced tariff in exchange for certain commitments (e.g., domestic sourcing, a certain amount of U.S. production).

Probability: Low to moderate. This approach requires significant resources and a coordinated industry coalition. However, it has been used successfully in the “steel‑import” cases in the 2020‑2021 timeframe.

5. Practical Outlook for Companies Mentioned in the Article

6. Timeline for Mitigation

7. Recommendations for Companies

1. Form an industry coalition (e.g., a “Trade Impact Coalition”) to coordinate lobbying and a joint petition. A coordinated approach improves the chance of a Congressional amendment or administrative waiver.
2. Prepare a “tariff‑impact” dossier that quantifies the “hundreds‑of‑millions” impact and ties it to specific policy goals (e.g., job losses, supply‑chain risk) – required for any waiver or legislative request.
3. Engage trade‑law counsel to examine:
   • Whether the tariff was properly promulgated under the APA (notice‑and‑comment) and whether ex‑post judicial review can be used.
   • Potential “unfair‑trade” claims under the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 201) that allow for a “dispute‑settlement” and possible temporary suspension.
4. Consider a “pre‑emptive” filing under Section 232/236 (national security) if any of the imported components could be classified as “critical” for defense. This may be a stretch for most consumer goods but is worth exploring for any tool components used in defense manufacturing.
5. Track the congressional calendar—the “Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act” (usually passed by early June) is often a place where “tariff‑relief” riders are attached. Engage with members of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee.
6. Prepare a fallback plan: If the tariff cannot be mitigated, explore cost‑pass‑through strategies, pricing adjustments, and sourcing alternatives (e.g., domestic suppliers) to reduce the net impact.

Bottom‑Line Summary

• Regulatory/administrative mechanisms (waivers, exemptions) provide the quickest but limited relief; success depends on the “critical‑need” narrative.
• Congressional action (carve‑outs, review clauses, compensation funds) offers a moderate‑probability route but requires strong lobbying and alignment with legislative priorities.
• Legal challenges (APA, WTO, statutory authority) are high‑risk, high‑cost and unlikely to succeed unless the tariff rule is demonstrably defective (e.g., lacked proper rulemaking or violates an existing treaty). They are usually a last‑resort tactic.
• Industry coalition and data‑driven lobbying are the most realistic way to mitigate the tariff impact for Stanley Black & Decker, Conagra, and similar firms.

In short, while there are several pathways for regulatory or legal mitigation, the most realistic near‑term approach is to pursue an administrative waiver combined with targeted congressional lobbying for a legislative carve‑out or “review” provision. Legal challenges would be a secondary, more costly, and less‑certain avenue.