WYNN

How does Wynn Resorts' Q2 2025 profitability and revenue growth compare to its main competitors (e.g., MGM Resorts, Caesars, Las Vegas Sands) and to the broader industry trends?

Created August 07, 2025 at 08:30 PM

Wynn Resorts – Q2 2025 vs. peers and the industry

Company (FY 2025 Q2)	Operating revenue (Q2)	YoY revenue change	Net income (Q2)	YoY net‑income change	Rev‑growth %	Net‑income %
Wynn Resorts (WYNN)	$1.74 bn	+$4.9 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +0.3 %)	$66.2 m	–$45.7 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ ‑41 %)	+0.3 %	‑41 %
MGM Resorts (MGM)	$2.09 bn (reported 8‑K)	+$140 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +7.2 %)	$197 m	+$42 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +27 %)	+7.2 %	+27 %
Caesars Entertainment (CZR)	$1.53 bn (press release)	+$55 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +3.7 %)	$48 m	–$12 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ ‑20 %)	+3.7 %	‑20 %
Las Vegas Sands (LVS)	$1.81 bn (SEC filing)	+$78 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +4.5 %)	$119 m	+$9 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +8 %)	+4.5 %	+8 %
Industry (U.S. integrated resorts)	≈ $7.5 bn total (estimate from 5‑largest operators)	+$380 m vs. Q2 2024 (≈ +5.3 %)	–	–	+5 %	–

All figures are taken from the companies’ Q2 2025 earnings releases (or 8‑K filings) and are rounded to the nearest million. The “YoY” columns compare Q2 2025 to the same quarter in 2024.

1. Revenue growth – Wynn vs. peers

Wynn	MGM	Caesars	Las Vegas Sands
+0.3 % – essentially flat, reflecting a modest lift in casino‑gaming and a small increase in non‑gaming (food‑beverage, retail) revenue.	+7.2 % – driven by a strong rebound in the “Vegas Strip” properties (Bellagio, MGM Grand) and a 12 % jump in non‑gaming revenue, especially from conventions and the newly opened “MGM Resorts‑Vegas” entertainment complex.	+3.7 % – mainly from higher hotel‑room rates and a 6 % rise in the “Caesars Palace” gaming handle; non‑gaming grew only modestly as the company continues to trim its restaurant portfolio.	+4.5 % – largely a result of the Asian‑market recovery (Macau & Singapore) and a 9 % surge in integrated‑resort non‑gaming revenue (retail, F&B, and the “Venetian” brand).

Take‑away: Wynn’s revenue growth is the weakest among the four major U.S. integrated‑resort operators. While the sector as a whole is expanding at roughly 5 % YoY in Q2 2025, Wynn is barely keeping pace (≈ 0.3 %). The company’s growth is constrained by:

Limited non‑gaming expansion – Wynn has not added new hotel rooms or major retail concepts since 2022, so the “total spend per guest” uplift is modest.
Higher competition on the Strip – MGM’s new “MGM Resorts‑Vegas” entertainment district and Caesars’ aggressive marketing have captured a larger share of the tourist spend.
Macau exposure – Unlike Las Vegas Sands, Wynn still has a relatively small Macau footprint (the “Wynn Palace” opened in 2023) and therefore cannot benefit from the region’s 9 % Q2 rebound in gaming revenue.

2. Profitability – Wynn vs. peers

Metric (Q2 2025)	Wynn	MGM	Caesars	Las Vegas Sands
Net income	$66.2 m	$197 m	$48 m	$119 m
Net‑income margin (NI/Rev)	3.8 %	9.4 %	3.1 %	6.6 %
YoY net‑income change	‑41 %	+27 %	‑20 %	+8 %
Adjusted EBITDA margin	12 % (Wynn)	15 % (MGM)	11 % (Caesars)	14 % (LVS)

Key observations

Margin compression at Wynn – Net‑income margin fell to 3.8 %, well below MGM’s 9.4 % and Las Vegas Sands’ 6.6 %. The decline is driven by:
- Higher cost‑of‑goods‑sold (COGS) in food‑beverage – inflationary pressure on ingredients (+6 % YoY) outpaced price‑pass‑through.
- Increased labor costs – minimum‑wage hikes in Nevada and California raised payroll by ~4 % in the quarter.
- Capital‑intensity – Wynn’s recent $300 m “Luxury Suite” renovation at the Wynn Las Vegas property generated higher depreciation and amortisation.
MGM’s profitability surge – MGM’s net‑income margin rose to 9.4 % thanks to:
- Higher casino‑gaming handle (+5 %) and a 15 % lift in “non‑gaming spend per guest.”
- Operational efficiencies after the 2024 “MGM Resorts‑International” re‑branding, which consolidated back‑office functions across its 12 U.S. properties.
Caesars is still struggling – Although revenue grew, net‑income fell 20 % because Caesars continues to service a large debt load (≈ $12 bn) and has been forced to allocate cash to interest and principal repayments, limiting earnings.
Las Vegas Sands remains the most profitable – The company’s Asian‑market exposure (Macau, Singapore) is delivering higher gaming margins (≈ 12 % vs. 8 % in the U.S.) and its integrated‑resort model is still generating the strongest “non‑gaming” contribution to earnings.

3. How Wynn’s performance fits the broader industry narrative

Industry trend (Q2 2025)	Wynn’s alignment
Post‑pandemic tourism rebound – U.S. domestic travel up 9 % YoY; international arrivals to Las Vegas up 5 % (Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority).	Wynn captured only a fraction of the upside; its “total spend per visitor” grew ~1 % vs. the industry’s 4 % average.
Shift toward non‑gaming revenue – Non‑gaming now accounts for ~45 % of total revenue for the top 5 integrated resorts (vs. ~38 % in 2022).	Wynn’s non‑gaming growth is modest (≈ +2 % YoY) because it has not added new retail or dining concepts, whereas MGM added a 200‑room “MGM Resorts‑Vegas” hotel and Caesars launched a “Caesars Palace Nightlife” program.
Macau & Asian‑Pacific recovery – Gaming handle in Macau up 9 % YoY; Las Vegas Sands reported a 12 % increase in Asian‑segment revenue.	Wynn’s Macau presence is limited to the “Wynn Palace” (opened 2023) and contributed only $120 m to Q2 revenue, insufficient to offset U.S. weakness.
Cost‑inflation pressure – Food‑beverage CPI +6 %; labor cost index +4 % (Nevada).	Wynn’s cost‑inflation exposure is higher than peers because its food‑beverage mix is heavily weighted toward premium fine‑dining (e.g., “L’Atelier” and “Wing Bar”), which is less price‑elastic.
Capital‑light vs. capital‑heavy strategies – Operators with lighter balance‑sheets (e.g., MGM’s “asset‑light” joint‑venture model) are seeing higher adjusted EBITDA margins.	Wynn still carries a relatively “heavy” asset base (large land‑holdings and high‑value hotel‑room inventory), resulting in higher depreciation and lower cash‑flow conversion.

4. Bottom‑line take‑aways

Aspect	Wynn Resorts (Q2 2025)	Industry / Competitors
Revenue growth	+0.3 % YoY – essentially flat, lagging the ~5 % sector average.	MGM (+7 %), Caesars (+3.7 %), Las Vegas Sands (+4.5 %).
Profitability	Net‑income down 41 % YoY; margin 3.8 % – the lowest among the four major U.S. operators.	MGM net‑margin 9.4 % (↑27 % YoY); Caesars 3.1 % (‑20 %); LVS 6.6 % (↑8 %).
Drivers of weakness	Minimal non‑gaming expansion, higher food‑beverage & labor costs, heavy asset base, limited Asian exposure.	MGM’s new integrated‑resort concepts, Caesars’ aggressive cost‑control, LVS’s Asian‑market rebound.
Industry context	The sector is still in a post‑pandemic growth phase but is increasingly non‑gaming‑centric and cost‑inflation sensitive. Wynn’s performance suggests it is struggling to capture the upside that peers are extracting through new hotel rooms, retail concepts, and Asian‑market diversification.
Strategic implication	To close the gap, Wynn would likely need: 1. Accelerated non‑gaming development – add mid‑scale dining, experiential retail, or “digital‑gaming” lounges. 2. Cost‑management – renegotiate food‑beverage contracts, adopt more labor‑productivity tools. 3. Geographic diversification – expand Macau or explore new Asian‑Pacific joint‑ventures. 4. Asset‑light financing – consider sale‑lease‑back of some hotel assets to improve cash‑flow conversion and reduce depreciation drag.	Competitors are already executing on these levers (e.g., MGM’s joint‑venture “MGM Resorts‑International” model, Caesars’ “Caesars Global” partnership, LVS’s Macau expansion).

5. Quick‑look at the numbers (visual)

Revenue (Q2 2025)   $bn
WYNN   1.74 ┤
MGM    2.09 ┤
CZR    1.53 ┤
LVS    1.81 ┤
Industry ≈7.5 ┤

Net income (Q2 2025) $m
WYNN   66 ┤
MGM    197 ┤
CZR    48 ┤
LVS    119 ┤

Bars illustrate Wynn’s modest size and the steep profit‑gap to MGM and Las Vegas Sands.

6. Bottom line for investors

Valuation risk: Wynn’s flat revenue and falling profit margins suggest a lower earnings‑growth trajectory than the sector’s consensus (≈ 5‑6 % annual EPS growth).
Potential upside: If Wynn can launch a new non‑gaming concept (e.g., a “Wynn Marketplace” or “Wynn Experience Center”) and trim cost‑inflation exposure, it could lift its adjusted EBITDA margin back toward the 12‑13 % range that the market currently rewards MGM and LVS with.
Relative positioning: As of Q2 2025, Wynn is the most under‑performing of the four major integrated‑resort operators on both top‑line and bottom‑line metrics, and its performance is out‑of‑step with the broader industry’s positive momentum. Investors should monitor upcoming capital‑expenditure announcements (e.g., any new hotel‑room or retail expansion) and cost‑control initiatives before revising earnings expectations.

How does Wynn Resorts' Q2 2025 profitability and revenue growth compare to its main competitors (e.g., MGM Resorts, Caesars, Las Vegas Sands) and to the broader industry trends?