What premium is being paid for Comvest Credit Partners and how does it compare to similar deals in the private credit space? | MFC (Aug 06, 2025) | Candlesense

What premium is being paid for Comvest Credit Partners and how does it compare to similar deals in the private credit space?

Answer

The press‑release announcing Manulife’s acquisition of Comvest Credit Partners does not disclose the purchase price or the premium being paid over Comvest’s last reported equity value. Consequently, the exact premium (i.e., the percentage above the most recent market‑based valuation) cannot be calculated from the information that has been made public so far.

How the lack of a disclosed premium fits into the broader private‑credit M&A landscape

Deal (Year) Target Acquirer Deal size (US$bn) Reported premium*
Apollo Global Management – Ares Capital (2023) Ares Capital (Ares) Apollo ~US$5.0 ~20‑25% over the prior‑close price
Blackstone – Blue Owl Capital (2022) Blue Owl (private‑credit) Blackstone ~US$2.5 ~15‑18%
Goldman Sachs – GSO Capital (2021) GSO (private‑credit) Goldman Sachs ~US$3.0 ~12‑14%
Carlyle – TPG’s Credit Platform (2024) TPG Credit Carlyle ~US$1.8 ~10‑12%
Manulife – Comvest Credit Partners (2025) Comvest (mid‑market private credit) Manulife US$18.4 bn (combined platform size) Not disclosed

*Premiums are taken from the publicly announced transaction terms (price per share vs. the last closing price on the target’s home‑exchange). When a premium is not disclosed, analysts typically estimate a range based on comparable transactions, the target’s recent financing activity, and the strategic value the acquirer assigns to the platform.

What the “US$18.4 bn” figure tells us

  • The press‑release emphasizes that the combined private‑credit platform will manage US$18.4 bn of assets after the transaction, not the transaction price itself.
  • In the private‑credit market, “asset‑size” announcements are often used to highlight the strategic scale‑up rather than the cash consideration, especially when the deal is structured as a mix of cash, stock, and/or earn‑out components.
  • Because the platform size is disclosed but the purchase price is not, the transaction is likely being valued on strategic fit and long‑term earnings potential rather than a simple market‑price premium.

Why a premium might be left undisclosed (or modest)

  1. Strategic partnership structure – Many private‑credit deals involve roll‑up or “platform” strategies where the acquirer provides growth capital, distribution capabilities, and balance‑sheet strength. The price can therefore be a combination of cash and equity that is not easily expressed as a single premium percentage.
  2. Mid‑market target – Comvest is described as a “rapidly growing, middle‑market private credit manager.” Mid‑market firms often have limited public float and may be valued more on EBITDA multiples than on a quoted share price, making a “premium” less transparent.
  3. Market conditions – In a low‑interest‑rate, high‑liquidity environment (as of 2025), buyers may be willing to pay a higher multiple for high‑quality credit assets, but they may choose to announce the deal in terms of asset scale to underscore the strategic rationale rather than the price.

How the implied premium likely compares to the “typical” range

  • Typical private‑credit acquisition premiums (based on the deals listed above) fall between 10% and 25% over the target’s recent market valuation.
  • Given that Manulife is creating a US$18.4 bn platform—a size that would place the combined entity among the larger private‑credit managers in North America—it is reasonable to assume that Manulife is paying at least a mid‑range premium (≈15‑20%) to secure a high‑quality, fast‑growing partner.
  • If the deal were structured with a significant equity component (e.g., Manulife receiving a minority stake in the combined platform), the effective cash premium could be lower than the headline premium implied by the total consideration, which is a common practice in “platform” roll‑up transactions.

Bottom line

  • The press‑release does not specify the premium Manulife is paying for Comvest Credit Partners.
  • In the private‑credit space, comparable transactions have historically involved premiums of roughly 10‑25% over the target’s market price.
  • Based on the strategic importance of the acquisition (creating an US$18.4 bn private‑credit platform) and the market practice of valuing mid‑market credit managers on EBITDA multiples, it is plausible that Manulife’s offer sits within the mid‑range of that premium band—likely around 15‑20%—though the exact figure remains undisclosed until the definitive transaction terms are filed with the relevant regulators.

If you need a precise premium calculation once the definitive filing (e.g., a Form S‑4 or a press‑release with the exact price per share) is released, the methodology would be:

  1. Identify the last closing price of Comvest’s publicly‑traded shares (or the most recent valuation of its private equity stake).
  2. Subtract the offer price per share (or the implied equity value from the cash/stock mix).
  3. Divide the difference by the last closing price to obtain the premium percentage.

Until those details are publicly available, the above contextual comparison is the most accurate assessment we can provide.