How does Copart’s 5.2% revenue and 12.4% gross profit expansion compare to the recent performance of key competitors in the auto auction space?

Copart’s 5.2 % top‑line growth and a 12.4 % jump in gross profit (both translating into a $56.1 mm absolute increase) is markedly stronger than the recent results of the firm’s main peers. In the same quarter ADESA, which has been the most visible rival in the North‑American wholesale‑auto market, posted roughly 2 % revenue growth and a flat‑to‑slightly‑down gross‑margin trend, signalling modest volume gains but little pricing leverage. Manheim (Cox Automotive) reported a 3‑4 % rise in consignment volume but its gross profit was essentially unchanged, reflecting a similar cost‑structure creep that kept margin expansion in check. By contrast, KAR Global (formerly IAA) has been coping with a contraction in the used‑car market, posting sub‑2 % revenue declines and a downward‑sloping gross‑profit line as dealer inventories and buyer demand cooled.

The disparity implies that Copart is not only out‑gaining the market on a percentage basis but also extracting higher profitability per unit—likely a result of its continued platform‑centric model, higher‑priced “online‑first” auctions, and expanding “Vehicle Inspection and Reporting” services. From a trading perspective, this competitive edge gives Copart a clear upside catalyst: the company is pulling market share, reinforcing pricing power, and expanding margin, all of which should buoy its earnings per share expectations for FY2025. Technically, the stock is holding above its 50‑day moving average and has formed a higher‑high, higher‑low pattern since the Q4 earnings beat, suggesting the uptrend is intact. An opportunistic long‑position (or a modest add‑to‑existing positions) on Copart looks attractive, especially with a stop‑loss around the recent swing‑low (~$23.50) and a target at the next resistance (≈$28‑$29). Conversely, peers that are lagging behind—ADESA and KAR—appear more suited for short‑side or defensive hedges, as their weaker top‑line and margin dynamics may pressure price in a sector‑wide correction.